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Remarks of the Chief Judge of the State
of New York
Lawrence H. Cooke*
I. Keynote Address: International Perspectives on the Right
to Privacy1
Founded in 1969, the International Association of Jewish
Lawyers and Jurists has as one of its objectives to contribute,
alone or in cooperation with other International organizations,
towards the establishment of an International legal order based
on the Rule of Law in relations between all Nations and States;
and to promote Human Rights and the principles of equality
and the right of all states and peoples to live in peace. This con-
gress and those convened in the past are the embodiment of
those objectives. It is under the umbrella of this lofty conscious-
ness that we convene from many parts of the globe.
The world is in turmoil, economically, politically and so-
cially. Perhaps it is a repetition of history but today's unrest is
real and seems quite different in some aspects from its predeces-
sors. Yet, all of us today, in our respective countries, yearn for
and strive toward the betterment of the human spirit. As mem-
bers of the legal profession, we hold a sacred trust: Perpetuating
and refining the law, to ensure individual justice and to benefit
the commonweal. In keeping with this ponderous responsibility,
we gather here to share our knowledge and opinions about the
law of privacy.
Privacy has been defined as "the quality or state of being
apart from the company of others ... isolation, seclusion, or
freedom from unauthorized oversight or observation."'2 In a
* Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, State of New York. B.S., 1935, Georgetown
University;, LL.B., 1938, Albany Law School, Union University;, LL.D. (hon.), 1975, Al-
bany Law School, Union University;, LL.D. (hon.), 1964, Siena College.
1. This address was made before the Fifth Int'l Congress of Jewish Lawyers and
Jurists, Jerusalem, Israel, on July 27, 1981.
2. WBS'=Ws Tfinw NEW INTL DiCToNARY 1804 (1971).
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broad sense, the right of privacy may well encompass what the
esteemed United States Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Bran-
deis termed "the right to be let alone".
As observed by Rudolf B. Schlesinger, the esteemed com-
parative law authority at Hastings College of the Law, in the
common law countries the great body of law has emerged from
the courts and has then been commented upon by the academ-
ics. In the field of privacy law, however, the reverse has been
true since in that special area the legal articulations have in
large measure been made first in academia and then have been
accepted or rejected by the courts. In several European coun-
tries, the opposite transition has taken place.
Recognition of a "right" of privacy as a distinct right de-
serving legal protection is of relatively recent origin. The inter-
ests thought to be implicated by the notion of privacy, for exam-
ple, freedom from physical invasion, originally were protected by
existing property and tort concepts' and by provisions of the
United States Constitution.5 The fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution,s for example, requires except in
carefully limited circumstances, that a warrant be issued by a
neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause before a
search or seizure is effected.' The sanctity of a person's home,
his castle, thus receives constitutional recognition. But in its
early application, the fourth amendment was not read to encom-
3. Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (192S) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis employed that phrase earlier in advocating recognition of personal pri-
vacy rights in a well-known law review article published in 1890. Warren & Brandeis,
The Right of Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. Rzv. 193 (1890).
4. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3; Posner, The Uncertain Protec-
tion of Privacy by The Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. Rnv. 173.
5. E.g., U.S. CoNar. amend. m ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law"); Id. amend. II, infra note 5; Id. amend. V -n... nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation").
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
7. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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pass the concept of personal privacy beyond protection against
physical invasion; there appeared to be no constitutional right to
be free of scrutiny by means not implicating physical security.8
Contemporary constitutional adjudication, however, has
wrought fundamental alterations in the values and interests de-
serving of protection. From the old hypothesis that only a physi-
cal invasion by police was prohibited by the constitutional pro-
scription against unreasonable searches and seizures, there came
to be recognized the real possibility that a person's sphere of
privacy could be invaded by nonphysical means.9 Indeed, ap-
plied to nonphysical intrusions, the fourth amendment could not
be read as protecting a right of privacy that encompassed the
right simply to maintain secrecy about one's self from unjusti-
fied governmental invasion.10 A person can now rely, however,
upon his or her reasonable expectation of privacy as a shield
against official intrusion, physical or nonphysical.",
There also exists constitutionally grounded guarantees of
individual privacy other than protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Absent compelling and demonstrable
need, the government may not inquire into associational ties.'2
More basic to the concept of privacy as it has developed from
specific constitutional guarantees is the right of personal auton-
omy or personhood, 8 the right to make certain decisions without
unwarranted government intrusion or oversight.14
Notwithstanding the relatively broad protection for the
right of privacy, the Supreme Court of the United States has
made clear that there is no all-encompassing constitutional right
to privacy, that "the protection of a person's general right to
privacy - - the right to be let alone by other people - -is, like the
8. See Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (overruling Goldstein and Olin-
stead, supra note 8).
10. See Posner, supra note 4, for a discussion of the distinction between a legally
cognizable interest in seclusion and in secrecy.
11. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Posner, supra note 4.
12. See Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Gibson v. Florida Legisla-
tive Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
13. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
14. See generally L. TREz, AMRimcA CoNsrMMoNAL LAw 886-990 (1978).
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protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the
law of the individual States. 15 Thus, interests in individual pri-
vacy must and do find legal protection through both common
law developments and state and federal legislation. The asser-
tion of a constitutionally-protected privacy interest requires the
existence of some governmental interference; nongovernmental
intrusion can be protected only by nonconstitutional judicial
and legislative responses.
A tort cause of action for an invasion of privacy, recognized
in some form throughout the United States,10 protects the indi-
vidual against unauthorized and unwanted intrusions into mat-
ters he or she desires to keep private. Thus, a person may have a
protectable interest against appropriation of his name or like-
ness for pecuniary gain by another; against an invasion of his
solitude; against placing him in a false light in the public eye, or
against public disclosure of private facts.17 The interest pro-
tected and the degree of protection may vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction and may be defined solely by legislation.' 8
Contemporary civilization poses threats to privacy beyond
the possible encroachments traditionally identified. In today's
technological age, it is becoming more and more difficult to safe-
guard personal information. With the increase in the availability
of optional and necessary services has come requirements of
more detailed disclosure of personal information to a wider spec-
trum of the providers of these services. In a simpler time, record
maintenance systems had controls on dissemination inherent in
them; manual filing and retrieval simply were more time con-
suming and less efficient. With the advent of the computer age,
the vast improvements in information processing techniques
have brought large stores of information to one's fingertips
quickly and easily. Record storage techniques, including
microforms, reduce the space necessary for maintenance, in-
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (emphasis in original) (foot-
notes omitted).
16. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OF ToRTS 804 (4th ed. 1971).
17. See generally id. at 804-14.
18. For example, New York has rejected the common law formulation of the right of
privacy. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
In New York, a limited right of privacy stems solely from statutory protections. N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 50 (McKinney 1976); Id. § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
(Vol. 2:231
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creasing the life of the record and facilitating easy access for ref-
erence and updating. As data gathering becomes more detached
from the subject, the individual loses control over what informa-
tion will be collected, by whom and for what purpose. Easy ac-
cess by the public and private sectors creates a danger that ex-
tensive dossiers can and will be created and maintained without
the knowledge or consent of the subject.
Given the impact of computerized fact gathering systems
and the abuses to which they may be subject, there has devel-
oped the view of a right of information privacy, which recognizes
the individual's right to choose the extent to which, and the time
and circumstances under which his attitudes, behavior, and be-
liefs will be shared with others.1 9 As a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, a broad right of information privacy has not been rec-
ognized on the reasoning that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in material voluntarily disclosed in the
first instance.20 Even if a constitutional right of information pri-
vacy were recognized, it would only protect against government
access and dissemination; protection against private sector ac-
cess and dissemination would need another source.
The call has been for statutory controls over public and pri-
vate sector input and readout practices to safeguard an individ-
ual's interest in information collection, accuracy and disclosure.
Federal and state legislatures have responded favorably with re-
spect to fact gathering activities of government agencies.2 1 Un-
derstandably, controls on fact acquisition practices of the pri-
vate sector have been slower to evolve, although some do exist.22
But if the legal status of personal privacy is to be given more
than mere lip service, greater efforts must be made to regulate
private information activities.28 The needs and interests of the
organization that gathers the information must be balanced with
19. Comment, The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information: Striking a Bal-
ance Between Personal Privacy Interests and Organizational Information Needs, 44
ALB. L. REv. 589 (1980).
20. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
21. For a discussion of legislative efforts to regulate information practices, see Com-
ment, supra note 19, at 602-07.
22. E.g., The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-1681t (1976 & Supp. II
1978).
23. See generally Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an In-
formation Society (1977).
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those of the individual about whom the information is gathered.
Indeed, information systems may well be the new frontier for
developments in privacy law.
Out of deference to those experts from countries around the
free world who will be reporting at this conference on the judi-
cial and parliamentary advancements of their respective nations
in the field of privacy law, my remarks on specific developments
in the United States are brief in nature.
The theme of this year's Congress is truly heartening for it
represents a firm commitment to human dignity. A right of pri-
vacy accorded legal recognition is imperative in a free society.
Unwarranted scrutiny can subject an individual to disapproving
pressures or hostile reactions to his or her thoughts and actions.
If the individual perceives that survival is at stake, there will be
a cessation of activity and society thereby loses its richest source
for progress. If new ideas are to be developed, innovative think-
ing and personal productivity to be encouraged, the human
spirit to be exalted to new heights, then individuals must be se-
cure in the belief that they, without fear, may close some doors
and thus prevent public scrutiny of private affairs. The bottom
line is that the human animal, if it is to be more than animal,
must have the opportunity to be nourished by this treasured
mark of human respectability, which is far more significant and
valuable than finite realty or chattels.
Of course, no person, as a member of a free society, can be a
modern day Robinson Crusoe and demand perfect privacy. Such
membership requires that there be some interaction, some bal-
ance, for the sake of the individual and society. But a free soci-
ety would not tolerate a total loss of privacy, for human develop-
ment would be stifled by constant scrutiny. The harrowing
specter of George Orwell's "1984 ' '24 need only be recalled to de-
mand that there be an adjustment made.
Tremendous developments in the law of privacy have been
witnessed in our time. This evolution has been reflected to a de-
gree in the evolution of society through technological, educa-
tional and economic advancements. Yes, law is a reflection of the
social order; as the late United States Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, it "is the witness and external
24. G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHT-FouR (1949).
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deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral
development of the race. '2 5 Thus, prevailing social values, as
discerned by judges, legal scholars and legislators, will be re-
flected in legal developments. To that extent, privacy rights will
continue to be respected in the law only so far as prevailing
desires for liberty demand. And, possibly, that is how it should
be.
Respect for privacy, however, cannot be made to depend
solely upon what may be the transient mood of the masses. Nor
can it be allowed to be snuffed out in a materialistic milieu. The
repercussions of inadequate protection for individual privacy in-
terests may be felt for generations. Thus, those who make the
law and those who contribute to lawmaking through advocacy or
ratification must act responsibly, lest cherished rights be lost
forever.
Mere fear of social change expressed by the established or-
der cannot and should not justify total or partial disregard of
personal privacy interests. This is not to say, however, that legit-
imate governmental interests in national security or survival
must be ignored in the face of claimed privacy interests. It
should not be forgotten that if a state is weak or helpless, there
will be no effective agency to grant or protect the privacy of its
populace. But all nations today face internal stress and external
dangers. It is too easy to invoke the incantations of "national
security" and "national emergency". The commitment to human
rights to which the free world is pledged demands that the invo-
cation of these and similar phrases be carefully scrutinized. Still,
means must be found to accommodate both interests. Otherwise,
by the slow but perpetual process of erosion, individual rights
will surely disappear.
Of course, the weightiest force to intrude upon privacy in-
terests is reposed in the sovereign government with its vast re-
sources. But privacy interests are also subject to unjustified in-
vasion by private parties. The law of privacy must protect
against each of these infringements with constant vigilance, for a
trespass adversely affects the one trespassed upon, no matter
what the source.
The right of privacy, the right to be let alone, has been
25. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of Law, in CoLLErm LEGAL. P-PmEs 170 (1921).
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termed "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." 26 Indeed, it has been observed that
"[t]he free state offers what a police state denies-the privacy of
the home, the dignity and peace of mind of the individual. '27
Represented at this Congress is a wide spectrum of legal
systems and schools of thought. We are here to share our views
on privacy, to study free world developments and solutions to
some common problems. We welcome the opportunity to ex-
change ideas, to learn and, it is hoped, to contribute to an im-
provement of human life in our time.
I. Individual Calendaring in the New York Courts"
No one person holds all the answers to any problem and, fortu-
nately, we live in a democracy bejeweled by its freedoms of
thought and expression. Fair criticism of judicial operations or
suggestions for improvement, therefore, are entitled to analysis
and response.
The courts in this country are in a Catch-22 situation. They
are beleaguered by an oppressive workload and, here in New
York State, are hampered by an archaic structure of eleven dif-
ferent trial courts. There is a desperate need for consolidation of
the major trial courts, for more judges, for voir dire legislation,
and for the elimination of inconsistent and outdated statutes.
Repeated requests for legislative relief remain unanswered.
Recently there has been a growth in interest for IC, or indi-
vidual calendaring for our courts. It is offered as the great addi-
tive, perhaps a panacea, in the field of operating the trial courts.
The enthusiasm of its advocates appears to arise, at least in
part, from its use in the Federal district courts of the metropoli-
tan area, and elsewhere.
The court system in New York State is unique in its volume
and its complexity. Certainly, it is one of the largest judicial sys-
tems in the western hemisphere. In each of the last two years
there have been filed in the major trial courts of this state over
2,000,000 actions, proceedings, and indictments. The New York
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. Address by William 0. Douglas, AimwCAN LAw INsTrruTE (1953).
28. This address was given at the luncheon of the Fund of Modem Courts at the
Citicorp Building in New York City, November 10, 1981.
[Vol. 2:231
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courts are presided over by about 1,000 judges and a few hearing
examiners. There is also a vast number of matters handled by
the 2,350 town and village justices in the State. It is also inter-
esting to note that in excess of 96% of all litigation in the nation
wends its way through the judicial labyrinths of state courts.
I respectfully submit that a universal or even prevailing sys-
tem of individual calendaring would not be efficacious in the
New York courts. In the first place, the courts of our State do
not offer the proper milieu for such a technique. Here there is a
constant need to transfer our judges from court to court, from
civil to criminal and from area to area, as caseloads require; this
fact in and of itself inhibits the use of the individual calendar
method. Traditionally, and through the years, judges in the up-
state judicial districts moved from county seat to county seat.
This was followed by movement across district and even depart-
mental lines. More recently judges have been temporarily as-
signed in large numbers into New York City and other regions of
the Empire State. Such temporarily assigned judges could not
operate under the IC system. The moving judge moves away
from the immovable calendar and is in no geographical or judi-
cial position to continue to adjudicate all the steps and phases of
a matter as it progresses from commencement to final resolution.
Secondly, individual calendaring in New York City would
mean considerable hardship for the trial bar. The ability of most
attorneys to service the demands imposed by both Federal and
state courts, civil and criminal, with each applying IC methods,
would be doubtful at best. On some law offices would be thrust
the duty of following a sizable portion of 253 calendars in the
Supreme Courts in New York City alone, besides the sizeable
number in Civil, Criminal, Family, and Surrogates' Courts in the
state system. Inordinate burdens would be placed on the offices
of the District Attorneys and the Legal Aid Society. For exam-
ple, there are 57 criminal parts of Supreme Court in New York
County alone. Individual trial attorneys, either as single practi-
tioners or associates of a firm, would find it difficult and disor-
derly to plan their schedules and prepare their cases when pres-
sured for trial by so many calendar commanders, each jealous of
his or her own calendar progress.
Thirdly, it would be frustrating to the judges to schedule a
trial only to find that one or more of the attorneys involved had
1982]
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previously been directed by another judge to trial at the same
time but at another place. It would be impossible to coordinate
the movement of so many calendars. There is a problem in this
respect even now with cluster calendar parts, but individual cal-
endars would magnify the vexation.
A fourth consideration which militates against individual
calendaring in New York is that the burden of calendaring ad-
ministration placed on each trial judge, irrespective of whether
the judge has a flair for such administration, would severely
limit the judge's availability for trials. In the past, it was found
that the calendar call in some individual calendar criminal parts
consumed as much as an hour and a half each day. Not only
would there be the uncertainty as to the length of a calendar call
and the consequent uncertainty as to whether a trial would com-
mence or continue each day, but great difficulty could also be
expected in scheduling the appearances of witnesses, particu-
larly experts like physicians.
Fifth, yet still important, "judge-matching," like "judge-
shopping," should be avoided. With an IC system and the as-
signment of a substantial number of cases to one particular trial
judge, there would be a great temptation, if not design, to com-
mission one trial lawyer to a particular trial judge who has a
predetermined calendar of long standing, where there is the like-
lihood of a friendly or compatible relationship.
Lastly, we must remember the admonition of Coke that the
science of laws must join hands with experience. Here, in New
York State, a system of individual calendaring was tried in the
First Judicial Department in the early 1970's, and court admin-
istration was forced to abandon it soon after inception, mainly
because the backlog of older cases grew out of hand. Formerly,
Queens and Kings Counties had IC Parts in Supreme Court ex-
clusively but they each abandoned the practice as well. It was
found that due principally to the volume encountered, individ-
ual calendaring could not dispose of enough cases to keep cur-
rent with an ever-increasing caseload.
The court system in New York is unique in many ways.
With eleven different trial courts and a number of specific con-
stitutional limitations on temporary assignments, it is complex.
While the federal district courts in the Eastern and Southern
Districts are conducted mainly at one address in each, the State
[Vol. 2:231
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courts, both in the City and State, are dispersed in many loca-
tions. The argument that Federal district courts in the Metro-
politan area operate effectively under individual calendaring
overlooks the lack of resemblance of those courts to the State's
judicial system. An examination of the "handle" or volume
should be convincing. First, as to criminal cases, for the 12
month period ending June 30, 1980, in the Southern District
there was a total of 882 felony and misdemeanor cases com-
menced, with a total of 210 criminal trials completed. In the
Eastern District, for the same period, there was a total of 615
criminal proceedings commenced and 196 criminal trials com-
pleted. For the calendar year 1980 in the City of New York,
there were 19,602 indictments filed in Supreme Court with a to-
tal of 2,091 completed trials. This is aside from the 182,968
filings in the Criminal Court of New York City with its 1,053
trials. As for civil trials, for the same respective periods of one
year, there were 457 in the Southern District, 209 in the Eastern
District and 4,908 in the Supreme Court of New York City. In
the New York City Supreme Courts, there are now 214 trial
parts, while there are said to be 39 full time District Court
Judges and Magistrates in the Southern District and 16 in the
Eastern District. In high volume areas, IC does not work well.
Since as the numbers increase, individual calendaring dimin-
ishes in value; and since the attributes of these Federal district
courts are so diverse from those of the New York City courts,
the Federal experience is not a reliable barometer and certainly
not reason for change in New York.
In New York City, the use of the "cluster part" system pre-
dominates. A cluster system involves a central calendar part sur-
rounded by several trial parts, the average ratio being about six
and a half trial parts to each central part. The calendar part
services the calendar and feeds ready cases to the trial parts.
Such a system materially reduces the number of calendar parts
which the Bar must attend and watch. It allows more judges to
be engaged in trials. It reduces the occasion when an attorney is
directed to be ready for trial in more than one court at the same
time. With its pool of ready cases and with the use of expediters,
it is possible to supply trial parts with hearings or trials on short
notice. It is noteworthy that in New York City the trial rate of
12% in criminal cases is twice as high as the national average.
1982]
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Actually, in New York City, we have a modified or hybrid
plan; in New York County there are three IC parts for long-term
detainee cases where particular expertise is deemed advisable.
Such a modification is also employed in Kings and Bronx Coun-
ties. Another variation appears in the Criminal Court of New
York County where two judges each are assigned to a particular
complex and serve as the only ones to handle all cases from be-
ginning to end. In some New York City counties all tax certio-
rari and condemnation matters are now tried in IC parts. It is
interesting to note that Dean Ernest Friesen of Whittier Law
School, a nationally recognized authority on matters related to
court congestion, at a recent national meeting of the. Conference
of Metropolitan Judges hailed the New York system as his pre-
ferred model.
Neither our thoughts nor our plans are cast in stone. We ask
experts to come here to evaluate our operations; we try to ac-
quire fresh ideas from other states, and we are open to innova-
tion. We have been progressive and we are anxious to improve.
It would be a serious mistake, however, to step back to individ-
ual calendaring, a method discarded after reasonable testing not
too long ago, and a method not designed for or compatible with
the high case volume or the court structure of New York City.
The fair and speedy delivery of justice is undoubtedly the no-
blest of human aspirations. It must remain our constant goal,
but it will not be achieved through the use of an individual cal-
endar in New York State.
III. Equality, Fairness, and the Rotation of Judges."9
Diminutive Tom Paine, of Herculean pen, became the
firebrand of the American Revolution. As assistant editor of the
Pennsylvania Magazine he had deplored the repulsive violations
of human rights he found in the colonies. When thousands of
colonists were wavering on the question of independence, he
published his little pamphlet Common Sense in which he ex-
29. This address was originally given at the First Annual Rivers, Toney, Watson
Dinner of Judicial Friends, at the New York University School of Law, December 11,
1981. This event honors the first three black Judges elected to office in New York City.
Honored in 1981 were black Judges from Maryland for their leading roles in contributing
to their communities.
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horted: "Freedom hath been hunted round the globe. Asia and
Africa have long expelled her... and England hath given her
warning to depart. 0! receive the fugitive, and prepare in time
an asylum for mankind!" 0
Then came his Rights of Man which set forth this philo-
sophical gem: "Every history of the Creation, and every tradi-
tionary account, whether from the lettered or unlettered world,
however they may vary in their opinion or belief of certain par-
ticulars, all agree in establishing one point, the unity of man; by
which I mean that men [and women] are all of one degree, and
consequently that all men [and women] are born equal, and with
equal natural rights, in the same manner as if posterity had been
continued by creation instead of generation .... ,,31
Only three years ago, Garry Wills, in his award-winning vol-
ume, Inventing America - Jefferson's Declaration of Indepen-
dence, challenged that the truth that bothers people most is that
all men and women are created equal.3 2 We received the answer
to this semantical twist way back in the civics classes of our
grammar schools: That while there are striking and obvious ine-
qualities in the externals, such as the capabilities and talents of
human beings, as to natural rights and governmental guarantees
there is absolute equality. In the idealism of our youth this
teaching of parity of privilege was sweet syrup for youngsters to
swallow; it made our chests swell with patriotism and pride.
Justice is the great commodity. Indeed, Madison saw it as
the end of government; the end of civil society. It cannot be iso-
lated in the abstract for visual perception but it is recognized
readily. It is not easy of definition but one ever present charac-
ter in its fabric is equality. Jefferson, in his First Inaugural Ad-
dress, exalted the concept of "Equal and exact justice to all
. ... "33 Frederick Douglass, the distinguished orator and re-
former, once wrote a letter carrying this message: The lesson
30. T. PAINE, Common Sense, in SELCTED WirriNos oF THOMAS PAIN. 8, 29-30 (R.
Roberts ed. 1945).
31. T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 78 (Citadel Press Ed. 1974) (emphasis in
original).
32. See G. WiLLs, INVENTING AMEcRA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
(1978).
33. T. Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in IA COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESDENTS 309 (1897).
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which the American people must learn, or neglect to do so at
their own peril, is that Equal Manhood means Equal Rights.
The United States Supreme Court Building in Washington is
adorned with the inscription "Equal Justice under Law". Con-
sistently, there is also discerned the attendant quality of fair-
ness. Goodhart in his ABA Journal article on Lincoln and the
Law" noted: "[Tie Lincoln the most important idea that the law
represented was the idea of fairness. 35
The notions we have of justice are of little value if confined
to the tomes of our libraries. The Declaration of Independence
has been declared by many, and undoubtedly rightly so, as the
greatest human document ever struck off by the human mind at
a single time. Its first declaration starts out with these words:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men [and wo-
men] are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights ... ."" These words, clear as
the peal from the Liberty Bell itself, were of little solace and
yielded no "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness"87 to
hundreds of thousands of human souls wasting in some of the
colonies in the very year of its declaration.
The principles of justice, which we revere at least out-
wardly, must be the driving force of our judicial power train.
There must be no institutional hypocrisy. For example, there
was a Sheriff's Jury in New York County. Robert Fichenberg, a
former editor of the Albany Knickerbocker News, wrote in 1975
that it amounted to a wealthy men's private club within the
state's jury system. The next year the State Commission on In-
vestigation found, inter alia, that the jury rarely functioned as
an official body (one day in the last forty-six months) and that
the Sheriff's Jury existed without women, those of Hispanic ori-
gin and only a token number of blacks. This was a good example
of inequality and unfairness and, consequently, of injustice. We
abolished the Sheriff's Jury early in 1979. Similarly when it ap-
peared that some functions of an official nature were being con-
ducted at places practicing discrimination, rules were adopted
34. Goodhart, Lincoln and the Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 433 (1964).
35. Id. at 441.
36. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
37. Id.
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barring reimbursement for expenses from public funds for any
judicial operations in such locations.
Studies have revealed shocking disparities in the penal
sentences meted out to persons with similar backgrounds con-
victed of the same crime committed under similar circum-
stances. These sentence disparities appear in the sanctions im-
posed by the individual judges of the same area, as well as
among the numerous regions in the State. Sentence disparity is
also seen between those imposed upon defendants with assigned
counsel as opposed to private counsel, and between those meted
out to non-whites when matched with those given whites. Is this
justice? Is this equality? Is this fairness? As a remedy we have
advocated, and are advocating, the creation of a Felony Sentence
Review Court, which would give the defendant the right to ap-
peal a sentence. Such a procedure may be the only effective
method of dealing with this perplexing and persistent problem;
this fundamental defect in our criminal justice system. Such a
review court or board is used successfully in no less than six
nearby states.
For over a decade, it has been found necessary in New York
City to assign Civil Court and Criminal Court Judges to the Su-
preme Court. Under the law these assignments are "temporary".
Yet some judges have been assigned for long periods, one judge
for 170 months; while other judges have never been assigned. Is
this temporary? The yearly salary differential between a City
Court and a Supreme Court judge is $7,350.
Allegations and rumors have spread over the years concern-
ing the reasons and selection methods for the assignments. In an
effort to be equitable and fair, to have our system perform bet-
ter and to improve the perception of the courts, a two-step pro-
gram has been instituted: A screening by a prestigious commit-
tee and rotation of those judges recommended for assignment.
The screening committee was organized in such a fashion as to
preserve the independence of the judges and not as to give an
"edge" to an active litigator. I am informed that the screening
committee nonetheless has invited appraisals of those being
screened from no less than 13 different bar associations.
There have been complaints and there have been pressures
to make us abandon the plan. The plan will not be abandoned
but every effort will be exerted to improve it and to make it
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work fairly and well. The argument has been made that the pub-
lic entitlement to quality justice outweighs the need to be fair to
judges. This reasoning is unsound; it involves a non-sequitur by
assuming that we can't have both quality justice for the public
and equity for the judges. We can have both, and we will! The
judges themselves will make this happen!
It is most important, for the sake of justice and for the per-
ception of it, that no prosecutor nor defense attorney nor other
litigator pick the judges. We want no "loaded dice" in the sys-
tem. One of the ills we are combatting and will combat with sys-
tematic attention is the number of adjournments or appearances
before disposition. Adjournments may have to be denied. Sanc-
tions may have to be imposed on those who refuse to try their
cases. It is important. to the public and to the judges that each
judge realize that he is neither obligated nor beholden to any
litigator or any other person for his or her assignment.
I believe we can improve our judicial system. The purity of
the process must be our constant goal. If it is, we as judges will
be proud of our performance; but, more important, the justice
and equality, promised at our nation's inception and constantly
yearned for, will come our way.
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